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Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law
BETHANY R. BERGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This essay begins to define, and invites others to define, where federal
Indian law fits into American democratic political theory. More
particularly, it attempts to discover where the claims of tribes fit into the
two dominant strains of that theory, liberalism and republicanism.
This question may seem overly abstract, even blindly so, for a
symposium dedicated to a treatise first created by Felix Cohen. Cohen,
impatient with abstract legal and ethical concepts, wrote long before he
ever met a tribal leader that "law must be valued in terms of what it does in
our social order, in terms of its effects upon human lives."' But Cohen was
not only a lawyer but also a philosopher by training, and was keenly aware
of the impact of theory on human welfare.2 I believe the seemingly poor fit
between modem tribal claims and democratic theory has very real effects
on Indian lives and in the courts hearing those claims.
In this essay, I first discuss the apparent contradictions between tribal
interests and a liberal philosophical framework, and its impact upon the
modem Supreme Court. I then show that when properly understood, most
tribal claims do fit within classical liberal theory. I acknowledge that some
tribal claims are distinctly those of groups or peoples, and so cannot be
adequately understood in an individualist framework. Drawing on the
work of John Rawls, however, I show that even these claims fit within a
liberal theory of the rights of peoples. Despite this, liberalism, with its
neutrality towards conceptions of the good and its emphasis on formal
* Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School, Associate Professor designate,
University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A. Wesleyan University, J.D. Yale Law School. Thanks
to Paul Berman, Laura Dickinson, Philip Frickey, Sarah Krakoff, Jeremy Paul, Christopher J. Peters
and John Rothchild for suggestions and encouragement.
' Felix S. Cohen, Modern Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOK. L. REV. 33, 48 (1934).
2 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Judicial Ethics, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 13 (1951) ("All of us who face the
obligations that our democracy attaches to the study and the practice of law have a responsibility... for
deepening public consciousness of the hopes, the ideals, and the values that are written into our
constitution and our laws.").
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equality, may still fall short in capturing the nuances of tribal legal claims.
I argue that the second dominant strain of American political philosophy,
the communitarian or republican strain, may better capture these elements
of tribal claims to justice. I conclude by proposing an approach that
combines these two strands of American democratic theory and discussing
several Supreme Court decisions that utilized this approach.
II. LIBERALISM AND TRIBAL INTERESTS:
APPARENT MISMATCH AND FUNDAMENTAL FIT
I began thinking about how tribal claims fit into American liberal theory
as part of that perennial occupation of law professors, the effort to
understand the behavior of the current members of the Supreme Court. This
is perhaps a more difficult task for Indian law scholars than it is for
academics specializing in other areas. It is relatively easy for us to explain
why the more conservative members of the Court typically vote against tribal
interests, which are, after all, specific minority rights that frequently clash
with state interests. But, as the other contributions to this symposium
demonstrate, we also have to explain why core members of the so-called
liberal wing-Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and particularly Souter-not only
join, but often lead the charge against tribal interests.3  Indeed, in contrast
with the 5-4 or 6-3 splits familiar from other areas, many of the Court's
most devastating recent decisions against Indian tribes have been
unanimous.4 Even worse, liberal Justices on the current Court have written
many of the opinions expressing the most disdain for and suspicion of tribal
interests in the modem era. Justice Stevens dissented passionately from
decisions upholding tribal rights to tax non-Indian business activity,5 assert
sovereign immunity, 6 and conduct gaming on their reservations. 7  Justice
3 See Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006) (criticizing
Justice Souter's proposed revisions to established Indian law); Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of
the Law: Title, Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006) (criticizing Justice
Ginsburg's reasoning in City ofSherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation ofN. Y, 544 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 1478
(2005)).
4 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001) (holding that a tribal court could not exercise
jurisdiction over action against state officials for unlawful search of a tribal member's home); Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001) (holding that a tribe could not impose taxes on non-
Indian guests at a reservation hotel located on land owned by a nonmember); Cass County v. Leech
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 114-15 (1998) (holding that the county could tax
reservation land owned in fee simple by tribal members); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 534 (1998) (holding that the land held by Alaska Native villages under the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act was not "Indian country" within which Indian law jurisdictional
principles applied); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 358 (1998) (finding
reservation diminished by act allotting land within the Yankton Sioux reservation); Strate v. A-I
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding that a tribal court, in a personal injury action stemming
from an accident occurring on a public highway running through a reservation, could not exercise civil
jurisdiction over a non-Indian).
5 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 160 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
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Ginsburg has not only-until the decision last December in Wagnon v.
Prairie Band of Potawatomi NationS-joined in each of the Court's rulings
against tribes, but has written two of the most devastating opinions against
tribal interests. Her opinion in Strate v. A-i Contractors significantly
expanded the limits on tribal courts by denying them jurisdiction over
personal injury suits brought against non-Indians arising from accidents
occurring on state highways on reservations.9 Her 2005 opinion in City of
Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York ignored established precedent
to hold that a tribe was not free from taxation on land it owned within a
reservation that had never been legally disestablished.'0 In a series of
opinions, Justice Souter has not only joined decisions limiting tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers but has urged the Supreme Court to go further
still, stripping it all away." In 2004 in United States v. Lara, a rare decision
upholding such jurisdiction, Souter authored a dissent that only Justice Scalia
joined-a strange and frightening alliance on the modem Court. 12
I think that to understand this phenomenon, we cannot simply say that
these Justices just don't like or understand tribes, but must take seriously
the ways that their liberal commitments may undergird their opinions. Let
me define what I mean by "liberal" in this context. "Liberal" here does not
mean "not conservative." Rather it refers to a particular form of political
theory, one with such an impact on American thought that no politician,
liberal or conservative, can wholly disavow its precepts. This theory
begins with the idea that individuals are free and equal, and equally entitled
to pursue their disparate ideas of the good life.' 3  Beginning with this
premise, liberalism focuses on two central goals: first, liberty, or protecting
individual liberties from undue state interference; and second, equality,
ensuring equal treatment and equal opportunity to individuals in pursuing
dissenting). Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Justices Thomas and Ginsburg, one of many
examples of the strange bedfellows created by federal Indian law.
7 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
' 546 U.S._, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005).
9 520 U.S. 438,459 (1997).
0 544 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1494 (2005).
11 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226-31 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 375 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659-60
(2001) (Souter, J., concurring); see also City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 1494 (urging the
Court to go further on the issue of tax immunity and hold that the tribe was barred by laches from
pursuing its land claims at all).
12 Lara, 541 U.S. at 226-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
13 There is no better evidence of the American adoption of the ideal than the Declaration of
Independence, which proclaims: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For more modem
descriptions of this philosophy as liberalism, see, for example, JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3-10
(1996); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 60, 60-66 (Michael J. Sandel ed.,
1984); Michael J. Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra, 1, 1-4.
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their separate conceptions of the good.' 4  There is a continuing tension
between these two values, between the extent to which individuals are to
be free from restriction so long as they do not interfere with the freedom of
others, and the extent to which we may be required to give up a measure of
liberty to further equality. We see this tension in a number of current
debates, including those over affirmative action, payment of taxes and
prayer in schools. But the majority of Americans, whether designated
liberal or conservative in common parlance, ascribe in some measure to
both of these values.
15
Measured against a liberal framework, tribal interests may be
perceived as special interests, inconsistent with the principle of equal
treatment. See, for example, the 1983 objection by then-Associate White
House counsel, now-Chief Justice John Roberts to taking land into trust for
the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe because it "essentially does nothing more than
take money from you, me, and everyone else and give it to 143 people in
Nevada . . . , simply because they want it.' 16 As he perceived it, the bill
treated people unequally and was therefore unfair. Similarly, public outcry
against treaty fishing rights, or more recently, rights to casino gaming, may
be based in part on the sense that vesting these special rights in Indian
tribes is contrary to the American ideal of fairness. (Of course the lack of
objection when non-Indian companies are granted special fishing licenses,
or when Donald Trump dominates Atlantic City with his casinos, suggests
that these protests are not demands for complete equality.)1 7
The liberal objection to tribal interests is even stronger when the
vindication of those interests appears to conflict with individual rights. We
see a stark example of this in Justice Souter's objections to tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers on the grounds that tribal courts need not
follow constitutional precedent "jot-for-jot."' s  This objection is also
apparent in Justice Stevens's concern for non-Indian oil and gas producers
subject to tribal taxes, 19 and in Justice Ginsburg's concerns for property
14 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 13, at 6-7, 23-24; ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 124-27 (1969); Dworkin, supra note 13, at 61-62.
S The rhetoric of the modem conservative movement, for example, supports public education
despite the limitation on liberty that financial support for such education implies.
16 Memorandum from John G. Roberts to Fred F. Fielding on Enrolled Bill H.R. 3765-Las Vegas
Paiute Trust Lands (Nov. 30, 1983) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
"7 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples",
39 UCLA L. REv. 169,171 (1991).
18 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Nell Jessup
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REv. 285, 344 n.238 (1998)). 1 begin to address these concerns with respect to tribal courts in Bethany
R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1047 (2005).
'9 In his dissent in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982), Justice Stevens
declared:
If the Court is willing to ignore the risk of such unfair treatment of a local contractor
[Vol. 38:813
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owners and cities whose property adjoined tribal land immune from local
taxation20 and non-Indian tortfeasors in "unfamiliar" tribal courts.21 These
opinions are rife with the implication that tribal rights are unequal, unfair,
and contrary to liberal ideas.
But much of this perception is inaccurate, the result of ignorance of
history and short-sighted, even illiberal, failure of perception. It overlooks
the ways that native people have long suffered from the unequal treatment
that liberalism abhors and the ways in which the modem struggle for tribal
rights is a response to that treatment. Felix Cohen, the great advocate of
tribal sovereignty, was also a pioneer in fighting for classic liberal rights for
Indian people, bringing some of the first cases establishing the Indian right to
vote and receive public welfare and social security benefits.22 Native people,
caught between federal failures of appropriation and state denials of
responsibility, still receive services inferior to those received by other ethnic
groups.23 The federal policy supporting tribal self-determination is in part an
acknowledgment of the fact that non-tribal governments have never provided
native people with access to equal services.24
More classical tribal interests can also be understood in liberal terms.
Take for example tribal rights to treaty land. The Ottawa and Chippewa
peoples of Michigan were some of the first tribes to sign allotment treaties,
which divided tribal lands among individual heads of tribal households.25
The classic story that Indian law professors tell of such allotment treaties is
that these were bad because tribal property was held in common, and so
or a local doctor because the Secretary of the Interior has the power to veto a tribal
tax, it must equate the unbridled discretion of a political appointee with the
protection afforded by rules of law. That equation is unacceptable to me. Neither
wealth, political opportunity, nor past transgressions can justify denying any person
the protection of the law.
Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 Justice Ginsburg's opinion in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 544 U.S.
125 S. Ct. 1478, 1483, 1490 n.9, 1491, 1493 (2005), emphasizes this, calling the tax immunity
sought by the tribe "disruptive" not once but four times.
21 Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
2 See Ariz. State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that the
Social Security Administration properly refused to approve an Arizona plan that failed to provide for
reservation Indians); Acosta v. San Diego County, 272 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that a
reservation Indian was eligible for county welfare relief); Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948)
(holding that Indians had the right to vote in Arizona); see also FELIX S. COHEN, Indians Are Citizens!, in
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE 253 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960).23 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING AND UNMET NEEDS
IN INDIAN COUNTRY (2003), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na073 l.pdf.
24 See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.01[lJ (Nell Newton et al. eds.,
2005 ed.).
25 See Treaty with the Ottawas and Chippewas, July 31, 1855, art. I, § 8, il Stat. 621. For other
treaties providing for allotment, see Treaty with the Winnebagoes, Feb. 27, 1855, 10 Stat. 1172; Treaty
with the Chippewas, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165; Treaty with the Wyandotts, Jan. 31, 1855, 10 Stat. 1159;
Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109; Treaty with the Kickapoos, May 18, 1854,
10 Stat. 1078; Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes, May 18, 1854, 10 Stat. 1074; Treaty with the Delawares,
May 6, 1854, 10 Stat. 1048; Treaty with the Ottoes and Missourias, Mar. 15,1854, 10 Stat. 1038.
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26individual ownership of property violated tribal rights. As we too often tell
it, the problem was that tribes needed special treatment, not equal treatment.
But the treaty negotiations fail to reveal any tribal objections on these
grounds. The tribal representatives were concerned instead with equal
treatment, with a right to land that would receive the same respect as the title
accorded to white men. As one representative stated: "We wish that you
would give us titles-good titles to these lands. That these papers will be so
good as to prevent any white man, or anybody else from touching these
lands." 27  They were delighted when Commissioner George Manypenny
assured them that was what the treaty provided-a land title that, in contrast
to what they had experienced since 1794, would not be stripped away from
them whenever the federal government decided it needed the land.28
Of course that's not what they got. Land-speculating vultures had
started circling even before the allotments were assigned, and the Indian
holders were defrauded off their land, had it sold out from under them to
pay illegally imposed taxes, and saw it assigned to non-Indians after false
claims that the Indians had abandoned their land.29 In one case, after the
government prevented foreclosure because taxes could not be imposed on
the land, a white land speculator-accompanied by the local sheriff-
walked through the Ottawa town of Cheboygan dousing its buildings with
kerosene and then burning them to the ground.3°
Situations in which Indian tribes are simply asking for equal treatment
are not only found in history books. Many recent tribal claims can be
understood as claims to vindicate liberal rights to equal treatment. The
Dann sisters of the Western Shoshone tribe have been litigating for years to
prevent the federal government from taking the land their family has been
ranching on for generations. 31 The federal government claimed that they
had lost any rights to the land when other representatives of the tribe won a
26 See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common
Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2001) (recounting and challenging the classic story of
Indian property ownership).
2' Transcript of Proceedings of a Council with the Chippeways [sic] and Ottawas of Michigan
Held at the City of Detroit, at 28 (July 25, 1855) (statement of Wah-be-geeg) (on file with the
Connecticut Law Review).
28 Id. at 27. The tribes had at this point made repeated treaties with the United States, in each one
making further land cessions in hopes of preventing encroachments on the land that remained. The
1836 Treaty, in which the tribes had reserved fourteen substantial reservations, was amended in the
Senate to provide they would last for only five years, "and no longer." CHARLES E. CLELAND, RITES
OF CONQUEST: THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF MICHIGAN'S NATIVE AMERICANS 228 (1992)
(discussing Treaty with the Ottawas and Chippewas, Mar. 28, 1836, art. 2, 7 Stat. 450,451).
29 See CLELAND, supra note 28, at 237; Bethany R. Berger, American Indian Law, in 1 MICHIGAN
LAW AND PRACTICE ENCYCLOPEDIA 375, 383-84 (2d ed. 2005).
30 JAMES M. MCCLURKEN, GAH-BAEH-JHAGWAH-BUK: THE WAY IT HAPPENED 80-81 (1991);
Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV.
21, 26-27 (2005).
31 See United States v. Dann, 470 U.S. 39,41-42 (1985).
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monetary judgment for unlawful taking of Western Shoshone land,
although the sisters maintained possession of their land before and after the
judgment, had never been notified of the claim, and had not received any
part of the compensation for the taking. After losing before the Supreme
Court, the sisters brought a claim before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. The international tribunal held that the United States had
unlawfully deprived the sisters of their property rights, including by
denying them rights accorded to all other property owners under U.S. law:
The record before the Commission indicates that under
prevailing common law in the United States, including the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the taking of
property by the government ordinarily requires a valid public
purpose and the entitlement of owners to notice, just
compensation, and judicial review. In the present case,
however, the Commission cannot find the same prerequisites
have been extended to the Danns in regard to the determination
of their property claims to the Western Shoshone ancestral
lands, and no proper justification for the distinction in their
treatment has been established by the State.32
Unmoved, the Department of the Interior responded by confiscating and
slaughtering the 225 head of cattle on the land.
Sometimes the Supreme Court can see the way that tribal claims are
claims to equal, liberal rights. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt, for
example, concerned tribal contracts to perform health care services for the
federal Indian Health Service.34 In making these contracts, the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) agreed to pay the tribes a certain
amount in contract support costs-the administrative costs incurred in
administering the contracts." When Congress failed to appropriate the
amount HHS requested for contract support costs, HHS refused to pay the
contract amount, even though it had uncommitted funds available.36 In a
rare win, the tribes were able to show the Court that simple equal treatment
demanded that they be paid. Ruling in favor of the tribes, the Court
emphasized the government's admission that "were these contracts
ordinary procurement contracts, its promises to pay would be legally
binding. '37 The tribes' lawyers were able to make the Court see that if the
32 Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, $ 144 (2002),
available at http://www.indianlaw.orgfWSDann caseIACHR final.pdf(footnotes omitted).
33 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 294 (5th ed.
2005).
34 543 U.S. 631 (2005).
31 Id. at 636.
36 Id. at 636-67.
31 Id. at 636.
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government could not break its contractual payment obligations to
Halliburton, neither could it break them with an Indian tribe.
Other times tribes cannot make the Court see the ways that tribal
demands are claims to equal treatment. Professor Singer's contribution to
this symposium shows that the Oneida Indian Nation was long denied an
equal right to vindicate its land claims, and only in the 1960s obtained the
access to the courts guaranteed to all litigants under liberal theory.
38
During the long process of litigating for its land, the tribe began to buy
land within its historic reservation on the open market. It claimed that this
land was entitled to the same tax immunity enjoyed by all other reservation
land. 9 In 2005, the Supreme Court ignored the long history of inequality
and focused instead on the rights of the surrounding towns that would be
denied tax revenue if the tribe succeeded.40  The Court applied laches
(ironically a doctrine intended to achieve equity)4' to defeat the tribe's
attempt to remedy over a century of inequality.
42
Similarly, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Court held that a tribal court could not
exercise jurisdiction over a claim for unlawful search and seizure against
state officials arising from their search of his reservation home.43 Justice
Souter concurred, passionately arguing that "at least as a presumptive matter,
tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers," and using the "special
nature of [Indian] tribunals" and the "overriding concern that citizens who
are not tribal members be 'protected... from unwarranted intrusions on their
personal liberty' to justify this presumption." Overlooked in this paean to
personal liberty is the fact thatMr. Hicks was in fact seeking to protect his
personal liberty by challenging government invasion of his home.
Incongruously, the Justices' concern for "intrusions on ... personal liberty"
led the Court to deny Mr. Hicks a local forum to challenge alleged intrusions
on his own liberty rights.
In each of these cases in which tribal rights are denied as special
treatment inconsistent with the ideals of fairness of our liberal political
philosophy, closer examination reveals them to be demands instead for
equal treatment, correction of long-standing injustices, or equal rights to
own property and pursue ideas of the good life. The perceived mismatch
becomes instead a problem of ill-perception, not illiberalism. There are,
38 See Singer, supra note 3, at 620.
39 City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. _ 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2005).
40 See id. at 1483, 1490 n.9, 1491, 1493 (repeatedly referring to the "disruptive" nature of the
remedy sought).
4' See Singel & Fletcher, supra note 30, at 36-37, 49-50 (describing equitable purposes of laches
doctrine and the inappropriateness of using it to defeat Indian land claims).
42 City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 1494.
4' 533 U.S. 353, 374 (2001).
" Id. at 376-77, 383-84 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693
(1990) and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,210 (1978)).
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however, some fundamental tribal claims that do not so easily yield to this
analysis. I discuss these next.
III. TRIBES AS PEOPLES: LIBERALISM AND
TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL RIGHTS
Not all tribal rights can be easily analogized to liberal individual rights.
Felix Cohen amply recognized this, when, in an essay called Indians Are
Citizens!, he wrote that "by and large the rights that are important to
Indians are not rights of citizenship, that is to say, rights accorded to all
citizens and denied to non-citizens, but are either human rights or tribal
rights."45 Think of some of the core rights that tribes have been fighting
for: the right to exercise civil jurisdiction,4 to impose criminal
punishment,4 7 and to tax and prevent others from taxing activities in their
territories. 48 Individuals may claim these rights-I may claim the right to
imprison all that do not bow before me-but it is hard to imagine that a
liberal theory could vindicate them.
Liberal theory may not recognize these rights in individuals, but it does
recognize them in self-governing peoples.4 9 Although the focus of liberal
theory has often been on the rights of individuals with respect to their
governments, it can also speak to the rights of governments with respect to
each other.50 Perfecting the relationship between an individual and the
state means nothing if another state may destroy that government; for the
same reason, state intervention on behalf of individuals belonging to
different states raises different questions than intervention to protect the
rights of a state's own members. Rather than describe all liberal theories of
relationships between separate societies, I will discuss just one: that of
John Rawls, the central figure in modern American liberal theory.
In The Law of Peoples, the last book he published before his death,
Rawls extended his liberal conception of justice as fairness to relations
between peoples. Rawls proposed that in recognition of the rights of
45 COHEN, supra note 22, at 257.
46 E.g., Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).4 7 E.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191.
48 E.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau
of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982);
McClanahan v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
49 Immanuel Kant, the father of modem rights-focused liberalism, founded this movement in his
last work by extending the social contract idea to relationships between governments. IMMANUEL
KANT, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS 107, 115 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1795).
50 In fact, the liberal theory of the relationships between peoples began with Franciscus de Victoria's
theories of the rights of the indigenous peoples of Latin America with respect to colonizing Europeans.
See FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS Er DE lYRE BELLI RELECIONES 127-28 (Ernest Nys ed., John
Pawley Bate trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1557); see also ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 96-97 (1990) (discussing de Victoria's influence on
international law).
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individuals to a stable state, liberalism demanded that governments
meeting certain conditions should deal with each other according to a
principle of mutual respect. Under this principle, each people would
respect the freedom and independence of the other and deal with the other
equally in treaties and agreements.5 1 In the same way that liberalism does
not demand that all individuals share a single conception of the good, so
Rawls did not demand that all peoples deserving of mutual respect be
organized along liberal lines. Rather, he wrote, this respect should be
afforded not only to liberal constitutional democracies but also to what he
called "decent peoples. 52 While Rawls did not fully flesh out the concept
of "decency," it does not require that peoples accord full equality to all of
their members. It does, however, require that governments not violate
fundamental human rights, such as rights to liberty and bodily integrity. 3
If we understand tribal claims as claims of peoples, they are easy to
justify on liberal grounds. It seems a matter of simple equality to demand
that tribes have jurisdiction over those committing torts on their highways,
or power to tax those engaged in economic activity on their reservations
and to prevent other sovereigns from taxing those same activities. Also,
understood as agreements made with peoples, it becomes much easier to
understand the ways in which courts have historically interpreted Indian
treaties: not as contracts requiring specification of each term, but as
documents protecting peoplehood, not to be interpreted, absent explicit
statement, to remove the prerequisites of sovereignty.54
Similarly, recasting the claims of Indian tribes as claims of peoples
provides a powerful response to those who would deny tribes jurisdiction
because their governmental institutions may not accord the full panoply of
American constitutional rights."5 No one could legitimately claim that
Germany should be denied jurisdiction over those in its territory because it
provides less protection for freedom of harmful speech than is accorded by
the United States Constitution, or because the right to a jury trial is almost
nonexistent. These differences are respected because they do not violate
the fundamental rights that we all agree should be granted to human
beings, whatever the society, but instead represent valid choices about how
best to balance community and individual rights.
Adding the requirement of decency also helps us to draw lines between
3' JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 37, 62 (1999).5
2 Id. at 59-61.
" See id at 64-66, 83.
54 Professor Philip Frickey develops this theory in explaining Chief Justice John Marshall's role in
the development of federal Indian law. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381,
406-10(1993).
5 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that tribal courts
have leeway to depart from Supreme Court precedent on the scope of individual liberties).
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the individual rights that tribes may restrict without outside intervention
and those that they may not. Take as an example Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, in which the Supreme Court held that there was no federal
jurisdiction over a suit challenging a tribal ordinance that accorded
membership to children of Santa Claran men with non-Santa Claran
women, but not to children of Santa Claran women with non-Santa Claran
men. 56 One could legitimately argue under a liberal theory of the rights of
peoples that a tribal decision to enforce such an ordinance should be
upheld, but a decision that more fundamentally violated human rights-
such as one expelling all nonmember children from the reservation-would
not. And it would be easy to draw philosophically defensible lines (as
liberal colleagues occasionally ask me to do) between the Santa Clara
Pueblo decision and a decision stating that peoples can intervene to prevent
women from being stoned for adultery.
Recast in this light, the claims of tribes, while perhaps not quite like
the claims of U.S. states, are nothing strange, nothing illiberal. They are
simply the claims to mutual respect and equality that all peoples are
entitled to demand of each other in a truly liberal society of peoples.
IV. A REPUBLICAN PERSPECTIVE ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Still there is something dissatisfying or incomplete in understanding
Indian law solely through a liberal framework of mutual respect for peoples.
Pragmatically, claims to sovereignty of other peoples do almost as badly
with the Supreme Court as tribal claims do. 5 7  Theoretically, moreover,
Indian tribes often do not look much like the independent peoples Rawls
surely had in mind. Tribal communities are often geographically,
economically, and culturally deeply intermixed with non-Indian
communities. 8  Claims that American ideas of a liberal constitutional
56 436 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1978).
57 Indeed, my claims that we do not deny Germany jurisdiction over the non-citizens in its midst
because of the different procedural protections in its courts may be accurate, but the threats of
United States policymakers to storm the Hague with the intent to repatriate any American citizen tried
by the International Court of Criminal Justice suggests that Americans are not willing to tolerate
procedural differences in some contexts. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002,
22 U.S.C.A. § 7427 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. 109-69) (authorizing the President to use "all
means necessary and appropriate" to secure the release of United States citizens and others from ICC
detention); see also Noah Novogrodsky, Challenging Impunity, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Dec. 1, 2005,
available at http://www.newint.org/issue385/challenging-impunity.htm (noting that the American
Servicemembers' Protection Act was nicknamed the "Hague Invasion Act").
58 I discuss this with respect to the Navajo Nation in Berger, supra note 18, at 1101-05. One can
see the impact of the geographic and demographic integration of tribes in many judicial decisions.
See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (concerning tribal jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian
who lived with a tribal member, worked for the tribe, and shot another nonmember Indian residing on
the reservation); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(concerning the Yakima's right to zone land in areas of mixed Indian and non-Indian owned land on the
Yakima reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (concerning the Crows's
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democracy should prevail may be more compelling in this situation than they
would be with respect to a wholly separate nation like Turkey, or even with
respect to bordering nations like Mexico and Canada.
I think a full theoretical framework for understanding Indian law
demands that we move from a solely liberal theory, with its emphasis on
individual choice and neutrality, to a republican or communitarian theory.
A republican perspective rejects the idea of the individual as separable
from the community, embracing instead the importance of the community
in creating and providing the site for sovereign actualization of the
individual.59 Such a conception of the relationship between individual and
society has been a significant, although lesser, undercurrent in American
political theory since the founding.60 This understanding, moving the focus
from either the sovereign individual or-as in Rawls's The Law of
Peoples-from the sovereign people, is an important complement in
understanding tribal claims.6'
Even more than for most individuals, one cannot understand claims by
Indian tribes if one accepts the liberal premise that what separates us is in
some important sense prior to what connects us-epistemologically prior
as well as morally prior. As Michael Sandel succinctly describes it, liberal
theory begins with the assumption that "[w]e are distinct individuals first,
and then we form relationships and engage in co-operative arrangements
with others"; hence the "priority of plurality over unity. 62  This is
precisely the opposite of the vision of the self held by many native people.
Among the Navajo people, for example, a proper introduction includes not
only one's name, but the clans of one's mother, father, and grandparents-
a simultaneous acknowledgment both of individual and relational
identity.63 The quest of tribes is not only to maintain political sovereignty
jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee land within Crow
reservation); Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (concerning Navajo jurisdiction
over a Sioux Indian who had battered the Omaha father of his Navajo wife).
59 The modem strains of this theory find their origins in the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau and
perhaps are most famously set up as a critique of contemporary liberalism in MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 59-65 (1982).
60 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 53-65 (1969)
provides the preeminent historical examination of the tension between republican and liberal political
philosophy during this time.
61 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 51, at 27. Another recent article advocates a communitarian
understanding of tribal claims. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic
Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443.
62 SANDEL, supra note 59, at 53. Rawls vehemently denies this or any epistemological vision of
the self, see RAWLS, supra note 13, at 27, but his and other social contract theories do conceive of the
basis of political organization as fair cooperation between individuals, regardless of whether those
individuals use their freedoms to develop other fundamental associations between themselves, and
seeks to accommodate those individual desires to enter into associations instead of taking them as a
fundamental organizing principle, id. at 29-33.63 See Claudeen Bates Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 21 (2002). To
[Vol. 38:813824
LIBERALISMAND REPUBLICANISM
as a bulwark against colonial oppression or means of maintaining tribal
property. It is also importantly a struggle to protect the tribal self that can
only be realized in the context of a distinct tribal community.64 It is a quest
for things that are meaningless unless they are shared. Indian tribes thus
cannot be understood as collections of individuals made up solely of
individual rights and needs, but instead must be seen also as communities,
for whom the conditions to function effectively is a fundamental good not
only for tribes but their individual members.
I believe that a more republican perspective helps to explain why
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the famous swing voter of the Rehnquist
Court, was not a swing voter in the area of Indian law. As noted early on
in her career, O'Connor's jurisprudence, and her swing voter status, can be
explained in part by the fact that her concern for individuals was often
mediated through her concern for communities.65 She was less concerned
with classically liberal invasions of individual rights, such as governmental
searches and seizures, than with actions that harm individuals'
relationships to each other, creating divisive lines between individuals and
the communities in which they participate.66 This belief characterized her
opinions issued in the last weeks of the 2004 term: Taking private property
is bad when it destroys a long-established community in order to further
generalized economic interests,67 just as government affiliation with
particular religious beliefs is bad when it divides a community by marking
"nonadherents as outsiders., 68 We can see this as well in her concurrence
in Lawrence v. Texas, in which she disagreed that the Texas law
introduce her remarks, Bates Arthur provided her clan (which is also her mother's clan), and the clans
of her father and grandparents, saying: "That is who I really am." Id. at 21. The importance of these
traditional ties is reflected in a Navajo saying condemning the behavior of an individual: "He acts as if
he had no relatives." Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Office of Navajo Labor Relations, 6 Navajo Rptr. 246,
264 (1990).
6 In an influential essay, Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie call this struggle the quest for
cultural sovereignty." Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Future ofIndian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 209 (1999).
They quote a statement by Muscogee (Creek) writer Joy Harjo that beautifully captures the relationship
between the tribal community and the tribal self: "I have lost my way many times in this world, only to
return to these rounded, shimmering hills and see myself recreated more beautiful than I could ever
believe." Id. at 196.
65 See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 592-604 (1986) (characterizing O'Connor's jurisprudence as distinctly feminine
and communitarian). While Justice Ginsburg's tenure has demonstrated that female justices do not
necessarily judge with what Sherry called a feminine voice, I believe her description of O'Connor's
jurisprudence as communitarian remains accurate.
66 See id at 601-04 (contrasting Justice O'Connor's willingness to grant judicial relief to
aggrieved insular communities with her "obvious hostility to the rights of criminal defendants").
67 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. __ 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671 (2005) (O'Connor J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the length of residence and the family connections of the displaced
homeowners).
68 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2747 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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prohibiting same-sex sodomy should be invalidated as violating a protected
zone of individual privacy, and urged that it should be struck down on
equal protection grounds because it made homosexuals "unequal in the
eyes of the law."69
Justice O'Connor's appreciation of community and the tribal struggle
to preserve the cohesion of their communities has led her to be one of the
strongest voices for the preservation of tribal rights on the Court since the
departure of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. 70 Her opinions,
however, also point to the limitations of a communitarian approach to
Indian law.
While liberalism, at least theoretically, does not prefer any particular
concept of the good, republicanism recognizes that communities are bound
in part by their conceptions of the good, and that political theory may justly
prefer one such conception over another. But any theory that permits
choices between communities will surely favor communities that look
more familiar to the judges. We see this phenomenon in Justice
O'Connor's decisions. In particular, when tribal rights are posed against
rights of other communities, she has been willing to prefer those non-
Indian communities over what the law would otherwise demand. For
example, Justice O'Connor authored opinions shrinking the territory of the
Ute71 and Yankton Sioux72 tribes that I believe can only be explained by
her concern for the non-Indian communities residing within their borders.
Each decision ignored strong arguments based on precedent and the Indian
canons of construction that the reservation boundaries had not been
diminished in the face of evidence that non-Indian communities existed
within those reservation borders.73
Justice O'Connor also joined two opinions by Justice Stevens that
advocated protection for recognizable communities over tribal interests. In
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
Justice O'Connor joined in Justice Stevens's plurality opinion holding that
the tribes had zoning jurisdiction over non-Indian owned lands in an area
dedicated to ceremonies, hunting, and gathering berries because the tribe
"continue[d] to maintain the.., area as a separate community," but not over
lands in an area in which time had "produced an integrated community that
69 539 U.S. 558, 581 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70 See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 96 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(employing canons of statutory construction to argue that excise taxes could not be levied on tribal
gaming activities); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 387 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (calling most
of the majority opinion "unmoored from our precedents"); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 175-76 (1999) (O'Connor, J.) (holding that the Chippewa retain rights under an
1837 treaty notwithstanding subsequent historical developments).
71 Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
72 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
73 See Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 348-49; Hagen, 510 U.S. at 423-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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is not economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries. 74 She
also joined his dissent in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,
warning that if tribes were free to conduct gaming on their reservations free
from state law, the surrounding communities would soon find themselves
plagued with "cockfighting, tattoo parlors, nude dancing, houses of
prostitution, and other illegal but profitable enterprises. 75
The point is not that tattoo parlors should flourish throughout Indian
country,76 but that a communitarian theorist is particularly vulnerable to
falling victim to what Cohen called "the egocentric predicament., 77 It is all
very well to say we must respect the communitarian claims of Indian
tribes, but another thing altogether when those claims clash with the claims
of other communities that look more like our own, or are made on behalf of
tribal communities that do not resemble the non-Indian conceit of the tribe.
V. REPUBLICANISM, LIBERALISM AND INDIAN TRIBES REVISITED
The way out of this egocentric predicament is to combine the insights
of both republicanism and liberalism in evaluating the claims of American
Indian nations. Such a combination would take seriously the needs of
tribes to exist as functioning communities, would accord tribes the mutual
respect owed to all peoples, and would acknowledge the inequalities
suffered by tribes and the obligation to afford them an equal opportunity to
define themselves to redress those inequalities. In short, I am advocating a
republican respect for community tempered by a liberal respect for equality
between peoples as well as individuals.
One could understandably complain that I am picking what I want from
each theory and respecting the purity of neither. But this is not inconsistent
with modem political theory, which tends to recognize that neither a liberal
individual-focused perspective nor a republican communitarian perspective
can tell the whole story. Nor is it inconsistent with a distinctly American
political theory which, since the debates between Jefferson and Madison, has
incorporated bits of each perspective, often as though there were no conflict
between them.78
74 492 U.S. 408,437, 444 (1989).
7' 480 U.S. 202, 222 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Indeed, as far as I am aware, Justice Stevens's entire parade of horribles reflected more on the
furniture of his own mind than the proposed money-making schemes of Indian nations.
77 Cohen, supra note 2, at 10.
78 For example, constitutional historian Linda Kerber, commenting on Frank Michelman's and
Cass Sunstein's view of republicanism, wrote:
Like Sunstein and Michelman, American dissenters typically want liberalism with
their republicanism ....
... Whenever the competitive individualism of bourgeois liberalism has appeared to
be the central problem, American dissenters have turned to republican themes....
This resilient republican language fused with major liberal elements has continued to
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One could also accurately quibble that this is all somewhat utopian,
and unlikely to be fully realized by what Chief Justice John Marshall long
ago called "the Courts of the conqueror., 79 But shifting the theoretical
paradigm employed by those courts may lead to results that are more
consistent with American notions of justice. To make this more concrete, I
will discuss three decisions from three very different eras that I believe
made these interpretive moves. Each of these decisions combined both a
liberal perspective on the claims for equal treatment by tribes and their
members and a recognition of what the maintenance of community rights
meant to the tribes involved.
The first opinion is Worcester v. Georgia.80 In 1832, Chief Justice
John Marshall began his historic opinion rebuffing Georgia's assertion of
jurisdiction over Cherokee land with an account of tribal claims to equality as
peoples. He first emphasized that before colonization, America's inhabitants
were "a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each
other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and
governing themselves by their own laws., 81 He then highlighted the fact
that colonization of these people violated liberal principles: "It is difficult
to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants
of the other, or over the lands they occupied .. ,82 While Chief Justice
Marshall has been criticized for not undoing that illegal colonization, this
historic injustice colors his subsequent discussion of the positive law at
issue, in particular the treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the United
States-promises of mutual respect by one people to another. These
treaties, moreover, are not only to be honored according to the principle of
equality, but also to be honored according to the needs of the tribal
community making them. They are not interpreted as contracts with an
individual or group of individuals, but rather as agreements with "the
several Indian nations as distinct political communities, '83 and against
assumptions that those communities would authorize the United States to
"manag[e] all their affairs, as they think proper," or reserve to themselves
mere "hunting grounds" rather than sovereign territories.84 It is through
be central to American political discourse, especially of the Left.
Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1671-72 (1988); see also
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997) (discussing the dialectic between liberal-capitalist and
republican-communal perspectives on property throughout American history).
79 Johnson v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
s0 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
"' Id. at 542-43.
821 Id. at 543.
83 Id. at 557. This point of course was first and best made by Philip Frickey. See supra note 54
and accompanying text.
84 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553-54 (construing the text of the Treaty of Hopewell, U.S.-Cherokee
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these lenses of history, inequality, and community that the Cherokee
treaties, which nowhere mentioned state jurisdiction, were determined to
make Georgia's authority on Cherokee soil "repugnant to the constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States. 85
Fast forward 127 years, and we find the same strategies in Justice
Hugo Black's opinion in Williams v. Lee.86 Williams, like Worcester, can
be criticized from a tribal perspective, particularly for accepting the
advances that state jurisdiction had made into Indian affairs in the
intervening period. 87 But it employs understandings of history, equality,
and community similar to those in Worcester to set up a vibrant barrier
against that jurisdiction, denying Arizona state courts the right to
adjudicate a contract claim between non-Indian Hugh Lee and Navajos
Paul and Lorena Williams. The Justices fully understood that the decision
was one enforcing the liberal ideals of equality. Professor Frickey reports
that Justice Frankfurter sent Justice Black a note on Williams v. Lee stating
that he was "pleased to concur in this indirect affirmation of Brown v.
Board of Education.88
Like Worcester, Williams v. Lee begins with the original status of Indian
tribes as independent nations, the conquest that induced them to give up their
independence, and the protection promised in return.89 It emphasizes the
illiberal history of prosecution tied to the Navajo treaty, stating that when it
was signed, "the Navajos were an exiled people, forced by the United States
to live crowded together on a small piece of land on the Pecos River in
eastern New Mexico, some 300 miles east of the area they had occupied
before the coming of the white man."90 This history places force behind the
promise of mutual respect implied in the treaty, that "the internal affairs of
the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal
government existed." 9' Next, to interpret this promise as denying a non-
Indian the right to bring an action in state court, the Court brings to bear a
sensitive understanding of the ways in which the actions of individuals affect
community cohesion: "There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of
state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to
govern themselves."92 In other words, this simple contract case involved not
Indians, Nov. 28, 1785, reprinted in Worcester, 31 U.S. at 574-75).8 1 Id. at 536.
86 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
87 Id. at 219-20 (describing the incursions on the principle of no state jurisdiction laid out in
Worcester).
88 Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: Judicial Divestiture of Tribal
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 29 n.140 (1999).
89 Williams, 358 U.S. at 218.
9 Id. at 221.
9 Id. at 221-22.92Id. at 223.
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just the rights of the plaintiff and defendants, but the social and political
fabric the treaty promised the tribe it could maintain.
The third opinion is the one most condemned by liberal critics of federal
Indian law, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.93 The opinion was written by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, perhaps the Court's staunchest advocate for
liberal rights. In an apparent departure from liberal principles, Martinez held
that federal courts had no jurisdiction to review claimed violations of the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) other than as part of a habeas review of
tribal custody.94 This meant that a Santa Claran woman could not sue in
federal court to challenge an ordinance that made her children ineligible for
membership in the Pueblo because her husband was not Santa Claran,
although children of a similarly situated Santa Claran man would be
eligible.95 Examination of the opinion reveals that this apparently illiberal
denial of access to federal court was actually fully consistent with Justice
Marshall's commitment to equality and community.
The opinion, in a now familiar move, began with the Santa Clara
Pueblo's claims to mutual respect as an independent people: "Petitioner
Santa Clara Pueblo is an Indian tribe that has been in existence for over
600 years."96 The opinion also touches on the vast and illiberal power the
United States exercised over such peoples. After describing the Pueblo's
continuing sovereignty, the Court declared that "Congress has plenary
authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government
which the tribes otherwise possess. 97 Tribal claims to respect as peoples
and vulnerability of those claims to federal power both weighed against
implying a federal remedy to ICRA violations: "[A] proper respect both for
tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area
cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative
intent." 98  As in Williams, the opinion also dwelled on communitarian
concerns, in this case the importance of defining community membership
and disruptive impact of having foreign fora resolve such public disputes.
99
The opinion thus recognizes the tribe's claim to independent peoplehood, its
members' need for a stable community, and the congressional power to wipe
both out, and comes down on the side of tribal rights.
The result is neither an abdication of liberal ideals nor an affirmation of
the challenged membership rule. It is instead an expression of Rawls'
principle:
9' 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
94 Id. at 72 (construing 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03).
95 Id. at 51.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 56.
98 1d. at 60.
99 Id
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Liberal peoples should not suppose that decent societies are
unable to reform themselves in their own way. By
recognizing these societies as bona fide members of the
Society of Peoples, liberal peoples encourage this change.
They do not in any case stifle such change, as withholding
respect from decent peoples might well do. 100
Rawls's words find an echo in those of Rina Swentzell, a Santa Claran
woman whose own children are barred from membership by the ordinance:
I thought long and hard about the Martinez case. I wanted
my children to be members of Santa Clara, although I had
married a non-Indian who I met in college. If the case favored
the Martinez family... I felt that Santa Clara would loose any
remnants of itself as a vital, self-determining community. I
was relieved to hear the decision. Santa Clara was to retain the
on-going conversation about who is a recognized member of
the community. But, more importantly, the Western world
was acknowledging a way of life which traditionally honored
nurturing and feminine qualities."l"
The decision, seen through her eyes, becomes a testament to the ideals of
American democracy, the recognition of the demands for liberty, equality,
and community by a long oppressed people. To end as I began with Felix
Cohen, this recognition is not foreign to the animating ideals of American
democracy, but instead is a partial attempt to be true to those ideals, a
measure of "the rise and fall in our democratic faith.
102
1o0 RAWLS, supra note 51, at 61.101 Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 98-99
(2004).
102 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
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